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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We live in the #MeToo era.  An era defined by changing norms—a 
moral shift catalyzed by the #MeToo movement.  The movement’s goal is 
lofty: to end sexual harassment and sexual assault.  The movement has 
faced backlash and criticism, but its impact is undeniable: brave survivors1 
came forward, powerful men were toppled, and laws were passed.2  Many 
articles refer to the #MeToo movement “shining a light” on the widespread 
problem of sexual misconduct.3  This phrase—“shining a light”—begs the 
question: where did the darkness come from? 
Archvillain Harvey Weinstein’s predatory behavior was obscured 
from public view for decades, despite being an open secret in Hollywood.4  
Survivors and reporters faced a “wall of sheer force and immovable 
power” surrounding Weinstein, who would undoubtedly try to destroy 
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 1.   This Comment uses the word “sexual misconduct survivor” to refer to persons who have 
been affected by sexual misconduct, a choice informed by advocacy groups and legal scholarship in 
this area.  See Key Terms and Phrases, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/articles/key-terms-and-phrases 
[https://perma.cc/82FW-89XJ] (last visited Jan.17, 2021).   
 2.   Anna North, 7 Positive Changes That Have Come from the #MeToo Movement, VOX (Oct. 
4, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/idsentities/2019/10/4/20852639/me-too-movement-sexual-
harassment-law-2019 [https://perma.cc/3NXN-JZQM].   
 3.   Nora Stewart, Note, The Light We Shine into the Grey: A Restorative #MeToo Solution and 
an Acknowledgement of Those #MeToo Leaves in the Dark, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1693, 1695 (2019); 
Chantal Da Silva, #MeToo Study Finds Nearly All Women and Almost Half of Men in U.S. Have Faced 
Sexual Harassment or Assault, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 22, 2018, 8:38 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/ 
after-metoo-study-finds-nearly-all-women-and-almost-half-men-us-have-815660 
[https://perma.cc/AWF3-DBY4].   
 4.   Harvey Weinstein: Did Everyone Really Know?, BBC (Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-41593384 [https://perma.cc/24ZL-9VK4]. 
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their careers if they exposed his heinous actions.5  Despite the massive 
power imbalance and potential repercussions, some women tried to shine 
the light.  Model Ambra Battilana Gutierrez filed a police report in 2015 
after Weinstein groped her.6  Weinstein’s former assistant Zelda Perkins, 
after breaking a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) banning her from 
speaking of a colleague’s attempted rape allegations against Weinstein, 
reached a settlement with him that mandated he seek therapy and only 
travel with a male assistant.7 
Ultimately, these attempts ended the way that many sexual 
misconduct accusations end: in a law office, signing a settlement with an 
NDA.8  The NDA wraps the claim in secrecy and ensures the truth never 
sees the light.  NDAs were used for decades by infamous serial 
perpetrators including Weinstein, Bill O’Reilly, and Bill Cosby—allowing 
them to continue their abuse unfettered.9  Thanks to the cascading norm 
shifts of the #MeToo movement, NDA usage is being scrutinized and 
questioned.  This Comment considers whether NDAs should exist at all.  
Section II provides a history of the #MeToo movement, defines and 
examines the different kinds of NDAs, and describes legislative responses 
to #MeToo.  Section III.A. analyzes the value of secrecy and argues that 
information asymmetry and diminishing marginal returns to 
confidentiality for serial perpetrators result in outsized benefit to the 
perpetrator and an unwarned, vulnerable public.  Section III.A. then 
weighs the individual survivor’s interest in confidentiality against the 
community right to warning about a perpetrator and evaluates three states’ 
approaches to the problem.  Section III.B. argues that the reactionary 
nature of court enforcement requires that NDA reform focus on the 
drafting process.  Section III.C. focuses on confidentiality provisions in 
mandatory arbitration clauses within employment agreements.  Finally, 
Section III.D. analyzes traditional contract defenses against NDAs and 
 
 5.   Id. 
 6.   Megan Twohey, James C. McKinley, Jr., Al Baker & William Rashbaum, For Weinstein, a 
Brush with the Police, Then No Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/nyregion/harvey-weinstein-new-york-sex-assaultinvestigation. 
html [https://perma.cc/79FM-YZUU].   
 7.   Former Weinstein Assistant Zelda Perkins Broke a NDA to Speak Out. Now, She Wants to 
Stop Their Misuse, CBC RADIO (Jan. 10, 2020, 6:29 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/radio/day6/mourning-
iran-crash-victims-former-weinstein-aide-zelda-perkins-watching-cats-while-high-design-20-more-1 
.5421075/former-weinstein-assistant-zelda-perkins-broke-a-nda-to-speak-out-now-she-wants-to-stop 
-their-misuse-1.5421083 [https://perma.cc/3QV2-P7N5] [hereinafter “Former Weinstein Assistant 
Broke a NDA”].   
 8.   Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/harvey-weinsteins-secret-settlements [https:// 
perma.cc/8XLC-NVN4] [hereinafter Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Secret Settlements].   
 9.   Id. 
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concludes that the norm shift of #MeToo should cause more courts to find 
NDAs void on grounds of unconscionability and public policy. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. History of the #MeToo Movement 
Tarana Burke was working as a youth camp director in 1996 when a 
young girl confided in Burke that she was being sexually abused by her 
mother’s boyfriend.10  Overwhelmed with emotion, Burke cut the girl off 
and sent her to another female counselor, but Burke never forgot the girl.11  
Recalling the incident many years later, Burke lamented, “I couldn’t even 
bring myself to whisper . . . me too.”12  This heartbreaking moment 
inspired Burke to create the #MeToo movement to help young women, 
particularly young women of color, who were survivors of sexual abuse, 
sexual assault, and exploitation.13 
In 2017, Burke’s #MeToo movement went viral.  The impetus was 
sexual harassment and sexual assault allegations published in the New 
York Times against Harvey Weinstein, a Hollywood producer who, for 
decades, used his power and influence to prey on women in the 
entertainment industry.14  In the wake of the Weinstein story, actress 
Alyssa Milano posted on Twitter, encouraging women who had been 
sexually harassed or sexually assaulted to reply to the tweet with “me 
too.”15  In response, #MeToo exploded, with 1.7 million tweets in 85 
different countries in the ten days after Milano’s tweet.16 
#MeToo-related accusations ended the careers of many prominent 
men and permanently changed the landscape in industries including film, 
journalism, comedy, and sports.  In November 2017, NBC fired Matt 
Lauer, co-host of the “Today” show, after several co-workers came 
forward with accusations of sexual misconduct, including an allegation of 
 
 10.   Cassandra Santiago & Doug Criss, An Activist, a Little Girl and the Heartbreaking Origin 
of ‘Me Too’, CNN (Oct. 17, 2017, 3:36 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/17/us/me-too-tarana-
burke-origin-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/3G2K-K7FT].   
 11.   Id. 
 12.   Id. 
 13.   Id. 
 14.   Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for 
Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-
harassment-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/E7KA-5SYS].   
 15.   Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 3:21 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/status/919659438700670976 [https://perma.cc/775D-RC9X].   
 16.   Lora Strum, Twitter Chat: What #MeToo Says About Sexual Abuse in Society, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Oct. 25, 2017, 1:07 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/twitter-chat-what-
metoo-says-about-sexual-abuse-in-society [https://perma.cc/6HHR-JR4A]. 
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sexual assault.17  In December 2017, Sports Illustrated reported extensive 
sexual harassment of employees by Jerry Richardson, owner of the 
Carolina Panthers professional football franchise.18  Richardson was fined 
$2.75 million by the National Football League and ultimately sold the 
team.19  A New York Times report found that, following the New York 
Times Weinstein article, over 200 powerful men lost their jobs following 
accusations of sexual misconduct, compared to only thirty men the year 
before.20 
The biggest question #MeToo asked was how these perpetrators were 
able to prowl meetings, workplaces, and hotels with impunity while 
scandal lurked under the surface?  How was all of this kept in the dark?  
Perpetrators used many mechanisms as weapons to hide their depravity 
and sexual misconduct survivors faced massive institutional barriers in 
coming forward.  For example, Weinstein did everything in his power to 
prevent sexual misconduct survivors from coming forward.21  He hired 
former Israeli military intelligence officers working for a private security 
firm to gain information from sexual misconduct survivors and journalists, 
with the goal of stopping any accusations from becoming public.22  He 
used his connections with American Media, Inc., publisher of the National 
Enquirer, to mobilize its journalists and undermine the allegations of 
sexual misconduct survivors.23 
Of all the mechanisms perpetrators use to hide their misconduct—
intimidation, money, private security firms—one of their most effective 
weapons is the NDA.  These standard contract clauses have played a gross 
role in silencing survivors of sexual misconduct.  NDAs are used widely, 
 
 17.   Ellen Gabler, Jim Rutenberg, Michael M. Grynbaum & Rachel Abrams, NBC Fires Matt 
Lauer, the Face of ‘Today’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/11/29/business/media/nbc-matt-lauer.html [https://perma.cc/WU55-REHV].   
 18.   L. Jon Wertheim & Viv Bernstein, Sources: Jerry Richardson, Panthers Have Made 
Multiple Confidential Payouts for Workplace Misconduct, Including Sexual Harassment and Use of a 
Racial Slur, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.si.com/jerry-richardson-carolina-
panthers-settlements-workplace-misconduct-sexual-harassment-racial-slur [https://perma.cc/79Q3-
R5FT]. 
 19.   Austin Knoblauch, NFL Fines Jerry Richardson $2.75M After Investigation, NFL (June 28, 
2018, 6:57 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000938897/article/nfl-fines-jerry-
richardson-275m-after-investigation [https://perma.cc/LLQ8-D57V].   
 20.   Audrey Carlson, Maya Salam, Claire Cain Miller, Denise Lu, Ash Ngu, Jugal K. Patel & 
Zach Wichter, #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Replacements Are 
Women, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-
replacements.html [https://perma.cc/4J66-NKAL]. 
 21.   See Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, supra note 8.   
 22.   Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Army of Spies, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/harvey-weinsteins-army-of-spies [https://perma.cc/ 
A8LV-7RHP].   
 23.   Id. 
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and with over one-third of the American workforce subject to an NDA, 
they affect the lives of workers at every pay grade and in every industry.24 
Alyssa Milano, in her viral tweet, asked survivors of sexual 
misconduct to respond with “me too” to gain a “sense of the magnitude of 
the problem.”25  She succeeded; the pervasiveness and magnitude of 
sexual misconduct is evident and shocking.  To eradicate sexual 
misconduct, the #MeToo movement demands monumental change.  To 
achieve this goal, it is necessary to focus less on salacious celebrity 
scandals and instead focus broadly on the legal institutions that enable 
predators to hide their misdeeds in the dark.  The law must evolve to 
prevent itself from being used to enable and protect predators. 
B. NDAs Generally 
This Section begins with a discussion of the pervasiveness of sexual 
misconduct in the workplace and its impact across different groups.  Next, 
this Section describes the options available to a sexual misconduct 
survivor and how an NDA can enter the picture.  Lastly, this Section 
categorizes NDAs into one of three categories: pre-emptive NDAs, NDAs 
in settlement agreements, and quasi-NDAs in mandatory arbitration 
agreements. 
In 1986, sexual harassment26 was explicitly recognized as a form of 
sex discrimination under Title VII.27  In the modern workplace, sexual 
harassment often goes unreported but sexual misconduct is pervasive.28  
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) projects that 
approximately seventy percent of workplace harassment goes 
unreported.29  Studies estimate that anywhere from one in four to nearly 
eight in ten women experience workplace sexual harassment over the 
course of their career.30  This is not a “women’s issue”; nearly one in five 
 
 24.   Orly Lobel, NDAs Are Out of Control. Here’s What Needs to Change, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-control-heres-what-needs-to-change 
[https://perma.cc/Z7YC-NRA2]. 
 25.   Milano, supra note 15.   
 26.   This Comment considers sexual harassment a type of sexual misconduct.   
 27.   Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). 
 28.   Chai R. Feldblum & Victoria A. Lipnic, Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in 
the Workplace, EEOC (June 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/report.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/9HRH-ZWS5].  Beyond the workplace, one survey found that 81% of women have 
experienced sexual harassment.  2018 Study on Sexual Harassment and Assault, STOP STREET 
HARASSMENT (Feb. 21, 2018), https://stopstreetharassment.org/our-work/nationalstudy/2018-
national-sexual-abuse-report/ [https://perma.cc/38EH-DMT6].  
 29.   Id.   
 30.   Id. 
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charges filed with the EEOC are filed by men.31  Sexual misconduct knows 
no gender binary and, in 2015, thirty percent of trans and nonbinary folks 
reported workplace discrimination due to their gender identity or 
expression.32  Importantly, sexual harassment has a disproportionate effect 
on vulnerable groups.  Between 2005 and 2015, the highest percentage of 
sexual harassment charges filed with the EEOC occurred in industries with 
large numbers of low-wage workers, and these positions are 
disproportionately held by women of color.33 
Following the misconduct, survivors can file a complaint with their 
employer and/or file a legal claim.34  If they file suit, many sexual 
misconduct survivors reach a confidential settlement before going to 
trial.35  A settlement may happen in the court’s view, with the parties 
agreeing to a settlement during litigation and asking the court to approve 
the settlement.36  Or, parties may settle outside the court, with a settlement 
contingent on the claimant dropping the case.37  Both settlements are often 
subject to a claimant promising to keep the settlement a secret; this 
condition takes the form of an NDA.38  NDAs are enforceable promises of 
silence that effectively allow perpetrators to “purchase the silence” of a 
sexual misconduct survivor.39  There are important exemptions that 
prevent an NDA from being enforced—NDAs cannot prohibit employees 
from officially reporting illegal conduct, for example—but studies show 
most employees are unaware of these protections and “the routinely broad 
 
 31.   Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Charges Filed With EEOC) FY 2010 – FY 2019, 
EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/charges-alleging-sex-based-harassment-charges-filed-eeoc-
fy-2010-fy-2019 [https://perma.cc/2JYW-2NLS] (last visited Jan. 21, 2021). 
 32.   Sandy E. James, Jody L. Herman, Susan Rankin, Mara Keisling, Lisa Mottet & Ma’ayan 
Anafi, The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER  
EQUAL.  4 (2016), https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X6SV-RRJU].  Sexual misconduct due to gender identity and gender expression is 
a form of sex discrimination under Title VII.  Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).   
 33.   Diana Boesch, Jocelyn Fyre & Kaitlin Holmes, Driving Change in States to Combat Sexual 
Harassment, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 15, 2019, 9:03 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2019/01/15/465100/driving-change-states-
combat-sexual-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/JB3W-GKKF] (citing Jocelyn Frye, Not Just the Rich 
and Famous, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 20, 2017, 4:59 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/women/news/2017/11/20/443139/not-just-rich-famous/ [https://perma.cc/R9HX-XF8R]).   
 34.   Exhaustion of administrative remedies and “right to sue” letters from agencies in the 
employment context are outside the scope of this Comment.   
 35.   Brian Palmer, Is $45,000 a Lot for a Sexual Harassment Settlement?, SLATE (Nov. 9, 2011, 
6:02 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2011/11/herman-cain-settlement-what-s-the-going-
rate-for-sexual-harassment-claims.html [https://perma.cc/M9MY-Z6DH].   
 36.   Vasundhara Prasad, Note, If Anyone is Listening, #MeToo: Breaking the Culture of Silence 
Around Sexual Abuse Through Regulating Non-Disclosure Agreements and Secret Settlements, 59 
B.C. L. REV. 2507, 2513–14 (2018). 
 37.   Id.  
 38.   Id. at 2514–15. 
 39.   Id. at 2513. 
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language of confidentiality clauses along with the threat of litigation 
chills . . . protected speech.”40  Should a survivor breach the NDA, a 
breach of contract claim would be filed and the settlement would have to 
be returned (likely with interest). 
 1. Pre-emptive NDAs 
Pre-emptive NDAs are frequent fixtures of employment contracts.41  
These clauses are used to prevent employees from disclosing the 
employer’s trade secrets and other confidential information about the 
business.42  More than one-third of workers in the United States have 
signed an NDA of this type.43  Pre-emptive NDAs can also take the form 
of a non-disparagement clause included in an employment contract that 
prevents an employee from ever speaking negatively about the employer.44  
These clauses are broad waivers forbidding an employee from making any 
comments that could harm the reputation of the business or any of its 
employees.45  This type of NDA was commonly used at Weinstein’s film 
production company.46  Though employees are able to discuss workplace 
misconduct amongst themselves,47 this type of NDA is a critical piece of 
legal armor for perpetrators. 
2. NDAs in Settlement Agreements 
Because employees can generally speak about workplace harassment, 
employers often include non-disclosure provisions in sexual misconduct 
claim settlement agreements.48  These settlement agreements—popularly 
 
 40.   Lobel, supra note 24. 
 41.   Id.  
 42.   Id.; see also Elizabeth Tippett, Non-Disclosure Agreements and the #MeToo Movement, AM. 
BAR ASS’N. (Winter 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/publications/ 
dispute_resolution_magazine/2019/winter-2019-me-too/non-disclosure-agreements-and-the-metoo-
movement/ [https://perma.cc/J3X7-GYW3].  
 43.   Kathy Gurchiek, States Take Action Against Nondisclosure Agreements, SHRM (Aug. 
28, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/behavioral-competencies/global 
-and-cultural-effectiveness/pages/states-take-action-against-nondisclosure-agreements.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/YE6V-XB86]. 
 44.   Lobel, supra note 24 (describing non-disparagement clauses as “a new common extension 
of NDAs” and pointing to efforts by the National Labor Relations Board and the EEOC to curtail the 
usage of non-disparagement clauses in employment contracts).  
 45.   Id.; see also Daniel Hemel, How Nondisclosure Agreements Protect Sexual Predators, VOX 
(Oct. 13, 2017, 7:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/9/16447118/confidentiality-
agreement-weinstein-sexual-harassment-nda [https://perma.cc/S42W-NZM2].   
 46.   Hemel, supra note 45. 
 47.   See Lobel, supra note 24 (discussing the National Labor Relations Board’s holding that non-
disparagement clauses unlawfully interfere with employees’ rights to engage in concerted activity).   
 48.   Hemel, supra note 45. 
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referred to as “hush money” or a “gag order”—pay sexual misconduct 
survivors for their silence about the sexual misconduct.49  Such settlement 
agreements often include a non-disparagement provision that goes even 
further than the NDA by restricting a survivor’s ability to speak ill of the 
perpetrator or the employer, with predictable chilling effects.50 
3. Mandatory Arbitration Subject to Quasi-NDAs 
Some sexual misconduct survivors do not have the option to file a 
public complaint because their claims are subject to mandatory arbitration 
clauses.  In October 2018, the New York Times reported that Google gave 
Andy Rubin, an executive and creator of Android mobile software, a 
“hero’s farewell” when Rubin left the company in 2014 after a credible 
accusation of sexual misconduct.51  At the time, Google did not announce 
that Mr. Rubin was accused by an employee of forcing her to perform oral 
sex.52  Instead, the company gave him a $90 million exit package, despite 
no legal obligation to do so.53  Following this realization, Google 
employees walked out to protest the mandatory arbitration clause in their 
employment agreement—the mechanism that Google used to keep Mr. 
Rubin’s misconduct a secret—and Google scrapped the policy.54 
Mandatory arbitration clauses are often part of employment contracts, 
included as a condition of employment.  More than fifty-five percent of 
American workers are subject to mandatory employment arbitration, a 
number that is likely to rise.55  Most mandatory arbitration clauses require 
that the proceedings be confidential, drawing a veil of secrecy around the 
claim and the proceedings.56  The #MeToo movement inspired survivors 
to come forward with sexual harassment and sexual assault allegations 
 
 49.   See Elizabeth Grace, Confidentiality of Settlements in Sexual Abuse Cases – Necessary Evil 
or Positive?, LERNERS LAW. (Jan. 31, 2013), https://lernerspersonalinjury.ca/articles/confidentiality-
of-settlements-in-sexual-abuse-cases-necessary-evil-or-positive/ [https://perma.cc/UK3Q-T749].   
 50.   Tippett, supra note 42.   
 51.   Daisuke Wakabayashi & Katie Benner, How Google Protected Andy Rubin, the ‘Father 
 of Android’, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/technology/google-
sexual-harassment-andy-rubin.html?action=click&module=inline&pgtype=Homepage [https:// 
perma.cc/2V65-QLVH].   
 52.   Id. 
 53.   Id. 
 54.   Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Ends Forced Arbitration for All Employee Disputes, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/technology/google-forced-
arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/F39W-Y54Z].   
 55.   Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1 
(Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/135056.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5QM-3MSC].   
 56.   Forced Arbitration, AM. ASS’N. FOR JUST., https://web.justice.org/what-we-do/advocate-
civil-justice-system/issue-advocacy/forced-arbitration-0 [https://perma.cc/4XRY-54LD] (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2021).   
2021] TOXIC SECRECY 553 
against their employers, but mandatory arbitration keeps many allegations 
in the dark because of the confidentiality clauses included in mandatory 
arbitration agreements.57 
Arbitration is private, but it is not inherently confidential;58 it is only 
confidential if both parties agree to confidentiality.59  The public cannot 
attend the arbitration and the arbitrator and arbitrator administrator cannot 
disclose information, but, generally, the parties themselves do not have 
any duty of confidentiality.60  This is a crucial distinction: the 
confidentiality clauses, not the arbitration clauses, are hiding sexual 
misconduct perpetrators.61  The arbitration system has been abused as 
confidentiality provisions have allowed perpetrators to misbehave for 
years as their employers settled cases confidentially in arbitration.62  It is 
difficult to estimate how many employment arbitration agreements include 
a confidentiality clause, but they are likely in widespread use.63 
Confidentiality clauses in mandatory arbitration agreements can be 
considered quasi-NDAs.  They are like preemptive NDAs because they 
are included in employment contracts and signed before any misconduct 
has occurred.  Like settlement NDAs, confidentiality clauses in mandatory 
arbitration agreements are triggered by a dispute and prevent parties from 
disclosing the dispute and its underlying facts.64  It is of paramount 
importance to include these quasi-NDAs in #MeToo-inspired 
conversations because the majority of American workers are subject to 
 
 57.   Hope Reese, Gretchen Carlson on How Forced Arbitration Allows Companies  
to Protect Harassers, VOX (May 21, 2018, 11:44 AM), https://www.vox 
.com/conversations/2018/4/30/17292482/gretchen-carlson-me-too-sexual-harassment-supreme-court 
[https://perma.cc/D9QA-6BZM].   
 58.   Christopher R. Drahozal, Professional Submission: Confidentiality in Consumer and 
Employment Arbitration, 7 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 28, 30 (2015).   
 59.   M. Isabelle Chaudry, An Analysis of Legislative Attempts to Amend the Federal Arbitration 
Act: What Policy Changes Need to Be Implemented for #MeToo Victims, 43 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 
215, 232 (2019).   
 60.   Drahozal, supra note 58, at 30–31.  
 61.   See id. at 31.  See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005) (examining the phenomenon of mandatory arbitration in the U.S., 
analyzing the impact of mandatory arbitration on individuals, and considering the broader societal 
impact of mandatory arbitration).   
 62.   Reese, supra note 57; see also Drahozal, supra note 58, at 28–29 (describing the confidential 
arbitration against former American Apparel CEO Dov Charney, who was accused of sexual 
misconduct). 
 63.   See Holly Weiss, Mandatory Arbitration Agreement Drafting Checklist, LEXISNEXIS 5 
(2018) https://www.srz.com/images/content/1/5/v2/156873/LexisNexis-Mandatory-Arbitration-
Agreement-Drafting-Checklist.pd.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6B5-6A55] (recommending the inclusion of 
a confidentiality clause in any employment mandatory arbitration agreement); see also Drahozal, 
supra note 58, at 42–44 (“I know of no empirical studies examining the use of confidentiality 
provisions in [employment] contracts.”).  
 64.   See Drahozal, supra note 58, at 37, 42.   
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mandatory arbitration agreements which likely include a confidentiality 
clause. 
C. #MeToo-Inspired Legislative Regulations on the Use of NDAs 
Many states have introduced #MeToo-inspired legislation relating to 
the enforceability of NDAs.65  Despite the momentum, outrage, and 
scrutiny generated by #MeToo, only twelve states passed new laws and 
only the New Jersey law invalidates NDAs.66  As a result, NDAs remain 
very much alive and in use.67  This Section considers laws passed in New 
Jersey, New York, and California as examples.  These three laws represent 
three different approaches that are likely to affect many Americans based 
on their respective populations. 
New Jersey passed a broad law that effectively negates both 
preemptive NDAs and NDAs in settlement agreements.68  The law makes 
any “provision in any employment contract or settlement agreement which 
has the purpose or effect of concealing the details relating to a claim of 
discrimination, retaliation, or harassment” unenforceable.69  The law 
implies that parties can keep the terms of their settlement agreement 
confidential, but not the underlying claim.70  The freedom to speak applies 
to the employer as well as to the employee.71 
New York passed its #MeToo-inspired legislation in 2018 and 
abolished the use of settlement NDAs, unless the NDA is requested by the 
 
 65.   Prasad, supra note 36, at 2520–22; Carrie N. Baker, #MeToo Update: States Enact New 
Sexual Harassment Laws—But More is Needed, MS. MAG. (Oct. 13, 2020), https://msmagazine.com/ 
2020/10/13/metoo-update-states-enact-new-sexual-harassment-laws-but-more-is-needed/ [https:// 
perma.cc/KA84-DBFN]; see also Andrea Johnson, Kathryn Menefee, & Ramya Sekaran, Progress in 
Advancing Me Too Workplace Reforms in #20Statesby2020, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CENTER 2 (Dec. 
2019), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/final_2020States_Report-12.20.19-v2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GKW9-837P] (noting around fifteen states have passed #MeToo inspired 
protections).  
 66.   Elizabeth A. Harris, Despite #MeToo Glare, Efforts to Ban Secret Settlements Stops Short, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/arts/metoo-movement-nda.html 
[https://perma.cc/D898-R2MF].   
 67.   See id.   
 68.   N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.8 (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c. 136 and J.R. No. 2); 
Vincent N. Avallone & Meghan T. Meade, New Jersey’s Latest #MeToo Law Goes Beyond Sexual 
Harassment, 9 NAT’L L. REV. 84 (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-jersey-
s-latest-metoo-law-goes-beyond-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/5UHD-HNQB].  The law 
contains exceptions for non-competition agreements and trade and business secrets.  N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 10:5-12.8(c).  
 69.   N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5–12.8(a). 
 70.   John MacDonald & Robin E. Shea, NJ Ban on Nondisclosure Agreements: What Does It 
Mean For Employers?, JD SUPRA (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/nj-ban-on-
nondisclosure-agreements-what-55560/ [https://perma.cc/TZ3Y-WERC].   
 71.   Id. 
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survivor.72  Employers in New York do not have authority to enter into a 
settlement agreement containing a clause that prevents disclosure of the 
“underlying facts and circumstances to the claim or action” if the 
settlement concerns a claim for which the “factual foundation . . . involves 
discrimination . . . .”73  There is an important exception: an NDA can be 
used if “the condition of confidentiality is the complainant’s preference.”74  
This exception for the sexual misconduct survivor’s choice is an important 
difference between the New York law and the New Jersey law because the 
New York law acknowledges that survivors may derive a benefit from 
NDAs, such as “reputational harm and professional retaliation.”75 
In 2018, California passed a law that prevents the use of settlement 
NDAs.76  Under California law, any NDA will be void as a matter of public 
policy and any attorney who includes such a provision in a settlement 
could be disciplined.77  The law includes some privacy for sexual 
misconduct survivors, allowing provisions that safeguard survivors’ 
identity if they so wish and the allegations do not involve a public 
official.78  Either party can request the inclusion of a provision that 
prevents disclosure of the amount paid in the settlement.79 
D. #MeToo-Inspired Legislation Regulating Quasi-NDAs in Mandatory 
Arbitration 
Following #MeToo, mandatory arbitration of sexual misconduct cases 
has caught the attention of private sector companies and state legislatures.  
In response to employee protest, Google CEO Sundar Pichai altered the 
company’s sexual harassment policy, making arbitration optional for 
individual sexual harassment and sexual assault claims.80  Other 
 
 72.   N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-336 (McKinney 2020); Jeffrey Johnson, Non-Disclosure 
Agreements and Arbitration Clauses in the #MeToo Era, JD SUPRA (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/non-disclosure-agreements-and-30226/ [https://perma.cc/AD2P-
94UP]; Natalie Dugan, #TimesUp On Individual Litigation Reform: Combatting Sexual Harassment 
Through Employee-Driven Action and Private Regulation, 53 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS 247, 253 
(2020).   
 73.   N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-336(1)(a).  
 74.   Id.  
 75.   Dugan, supra note 72, at 255 (citations omitted).  
 76.   CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1001–1002 (West, Westlaw. through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
 77.   Id. § 1002(e). 
 78.   Id. § 1001(c). 
 79.   Id. § 1001(e). 
 80.   Kate Conger & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Overhauls Sexual Misconduct Policy After 
Employee Walkout, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/ 
technology/google-arbitration-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/F2VM-444K].   
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companies changing their policies include Facebook, Uber, and Lyft.81 
Legislatures in several states reacted to #MeToo by passing legislation 
regulating the use of mandatory arbitration clauses.  These efforts have 
focused on eliminating mandatory arbitration itself, rather than focusing 
on confidentiality in mandatory arbitration.  This Section focuses on the 
different approaches of the laws passed in Maryland and New York.  The 
Maryland legislation represents an approach that specifically targets 
mandatory arbitration of sexual misconduct claims.  The New York 
legislation represents a broad approach targeting all mandatory arbitration 
and has, predictably, faced legal challenge. 
In 2018, Maryland enacted the Disclosing Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace Act.82  The act limits the use of mandatory arbitration clauses 
by voiding any “provision in an employment contract, policy, or 
agreement that waives any substantive or procedural right or remedy to a 
claim that accrues in the future of sexual harassment or retaliation for 
reporting or asserting a right or remedy based on sexual 
harassment . . . .”83 
The New York legislature acted in July 2018 by passing a sweeping 
law, referred to here as Section 7515, prohibiting the enforcement of 
mandatory arbitration in all types of claims.84  The law prohibits “any 
clause or provision in any contract which requires as a condition of the 
enforcement of the contract or obtaining remedies under the contract that 
the parties submit to mandatory arbitration to resolve any allegation or 
claim of discrimination . . . .”85 
The New York law was challenged in Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co.86  
In Latif, the plaintiff signed a written offer of employment with Morgan 
Stanley that included an arbitration agreement.87  The plaintiff brought 
 
 81.   Daisuke Wakabayashi & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Facebook to Drop Forced Arbitration 
in Sexual Harassment Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/11/09/technology/facebook-arbitration-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/XSL3-JE57]; 
Laharee Chatterjee, Uber, Lyft Scrap Mandatory Arbitration for Sexual Assault Claims, REUTERS 
(May 15, 2018, 5:59 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-sexual-harassment/uber-lyft-
scrap-mandatory-arbitration-for-sexual-assault-claims-idUSKCN1IG1I2 [https://perma.cc/9GKL-
GNHR].   
 82.   MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-715 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. of the 
Gen. Assemb.). 
 83.   Id. § 3-715(a). 
 84.   N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7515 (McKinney 2019); Traycee Ellen Klein, Shira M. Blank, & Amanda 
M. Gomez, Federal Court Declares That a Ban on Mandatory Arbitration of Sexual Harassment 
Claims Is Inconsistent with Federal Law, 9 NAT’L L. REV. 189 (July 8, 2019), https:// 
www.natlawreview.com/article/federal-court-declares-ban-mandatory-arbitration-sexualharassment- 
claims [https://perma.cc/8V6U-3ER6].   
 85.   N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7515(a)(2).  
 86.   No. 18-cv-11528 (DLC), 2019 WL 2610985 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2019).   
 87.   Id. at *1. 
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claims of discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation 
against his employer.88  The court found the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”) “requires courts to enforce covered arbitration agreements 
according to their terms.”89  Section 7515, however, nullifies and voids 
agreements to arbitrate sexual harassment claims “[e]xcept where 
inconsistent with federal law . . . .”90  The court invalidated Section 7515 
because its application would be inconsistent with the FAA.  This ruling 
bodes ill for other #MeToo-inspired state laws that nullify and void 
mandatory arbitration agreements but does not address state laws, such as 
the Maryland law, that only target sexual misconduct claims.91 
III. ANALYSIS 
NDAs faced heavy public scrutiny in the wake of #MeToo.92  #MeToo 
generated broad support for the idea that the public has a right to know the 
danger posed by perpetrators of sexual misconduct93 but NDAs allow 
perpetrators to prey on others who have no warning.94  However, some 
have argued that any change to the current law will make it harder for 
parties to settle.95 
Section III.A argues that, due to the nature of sexual misconduct 
claims, the community right to know about the misdeeds and potential 
danger of a perpetrator outweighs the individual survivor’s need for 
confidentiality.  The community right outweighs the individual right 
because of the information asymmetry at settlement between survivors and 
perpetrators and the diminishing marginal returns to survivor 
confidentiality in the case of serial perpetrators.  The California law 
represents the best approach to balancing these competing interests. 
 
 88.   Id.  
 89.   Id. at *2 (quoting Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1412 (2019)).   
 90.   N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7515(b)(iii). 
 91.   The preemption of state laws that invalidate arbitration clauses for sexual misconduct claims 
by the Federal Arbitration Act is outside the scope of this Comment.  
 92.   See, e.g., Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, supra note 8 (“But recent 
revelations of sexual abuse by powerful men in entertainment, politics, journalism, and other fields 
have raised questions about whether the use of these agreements should be curtailed, particularly when 
there is a stark power imbalance between the accuser and the accused.”).  
 93.   See Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil, Criminal, and 
Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 314–15 (2018).   
 94.   Harris, supra note 66.   
 95.   Gloria Allred, Opinion: Gloria Allred: Assault Victims Have Every Right to Keep Their 
Trauma and Their Settlements Private, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2019, 3:00 AM), https:// 
www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-09-23/metoo-sexual-abuse-victims-confidential-settlements-la 
wsuits [https://perma.cc/BV98-6JRY]; Emily Haigh & David M. Wirtz, #MeToo: In Defense of 
Nondisclosure Agreements, LITTLER (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.littler.com/publication-
press/publication/metoo-defense-nondisclosure-agreements [https://perma.cc/AT2C-H723].  
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Section III.B argues that reform of the NDA drafting process is 
necessary because of the inherently reactionary nature of court 
enforcement.  #MeToo has shown that many survivors are not getting what 
they need from their settlement NDAs.  Section III.B argues that survivors’ 
attorneys should work to understand how their clients’ trauma may affect 
client decision-making and, if a settlement NDA is to be included, 
survivors’ attorneys must zealously negotiate the value of their clients’ 
secrecy and consider creative NDA options. 
Section III.C argues that arbitration has benefit to both parties but can 
provide additional benefits to sexual misconduct survivors.  Privacy and 
confidentiality in arbitration are very different; privacy serves the needs of 
survivors, but confidentiality does not.  Quasi-NDAs in mandatory 
arbitration agreements present an opportunity for both legislatures and 
survivors. 
Section III.D advocates for modernizing traditional contract defenses.  
#MeToo was a massive norm shift that must be accounted for when courts 
are considering whether to invalidate NDAs on the grounds of 
unconscionability and public policy.  Section III.D provides a framework 
and factors for courts to use when evaluating NDAs for unconscionability 
and it further argues for revitalization of the public policy doctrine. 
A. The Value of Secrecy 
NDAs can provide benefits to both parties.  Perpetrators may seek a 
sexual misconduct survivor’s silence for several reasons: to continue their 
misconduct, to provide certainty and closure, and to protect them from a 
false accusation.  First, the muzzling of a perpetrator’s sexual misconduct 
survivors will prevent them from warning others, allowing the perpetrator 
to continue to misbehave and avoid the consequences of their 
misconduct.96  Second, perpetrators may seek a confidential settlement for 
its “certainty, finality, and closure . . . .”97  This is especially true when a 
risk of public, lengthy litigation exists.98  Lastly, a person falsely accused 
of sexual misconduct likely desires confidentiality, though false 
accusations are rare.99  NDAs protect the falsely accused from the negative 
 
 96.   See Levmore & Fagan, supra note 93, at 314–15.   
 97.   Grace, supra note 49. 
 98.   Id. 
 99.   Anita Raj, Worried About Sexual Harassment — Or False Allegations?  Our Team Asked 
Americans About Their Experiences and Beliefs, THE CONVERSATION, 
https://theconversation.com/worried-about-sexual-harassment-or-false-allegations-our-team-asked-a 
mericans-about-their-experiences-and-beliefs-116715 [https://perma.cc/JA4Z-7RSS] (“[O]nly 2% of 
men and 1% of women said they had ever been accused of these abuses.  That shows that, while 
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reputational consequences of having paid to settle a claim of sexual 
misconduct. 
NDAs can also benefit sexual misconduct survivors.  Bringing a claim 
or reaching a settlement could brand sexual misconduct survivors as 
litigious, a label that could be detrimental to their careers.100  The 
experience was likely traumatic and a confidential settlement prevents a 
sexual misconduct survivor from having to discuss the painful ordeal.101  
Sexual misconduct claims can be difficult to litigate; often, claims lack 
concrete evidence and rest on a “he-said, she-said” dispute.102  Offering 
confidentiality may make the settlement process easier for a sexual 
misconduct survivor who desires settlement; the defense is less likely to 
settle without an NDA.103  A sexual misconduct survivor might be 
embarrassed and want to avoid being stigmatized.104  Lastly, sexual 
misconduct survivors may be able to extract a higher settlement amount if 
they are willing to agree to secrecy.105  Survivors’ interests in their own 
privacy are important and if these interests are not considered, the law risks 
“chilling plaintiffs.”106 
Despite the benefits of NDAs to sexual misconduct survivors, 
ultimately, much of the benefit from confidentiality goes to the oft-more-
powerful perpetrator.  These are valid reasons for survivors to want an 
NDA, but stigma lies at the heart of these concerns, blaming and punishing 
sexual misconduct survivors.107  Hopefully, the cascading norm change of 
#MeToo alleviates some of this stigma and removes some of these 
survivor concerns.  The larger benefit for the more powerful perpetrator 
often comes from a better job, higher salary, and notoriety within an 
 
ongoing public perceptions of false accusations as a major risk persist, any accusation, including false 
accusations, is in fact very rare.”).  False reports of sexual assault to the police serve as a useful proxy 
and provide further data.  See False Reports, NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR. (2012), 
https://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/Publications_NSVRC_Overview_False-Reporting.pdf [http 
s://perma.cc/C5SH-2QY4] (“A review of research finds that the prevalence of false reporting is 
between 2 percent and 10 percent.”).  
 100.   Annie Hill, Nondisclosure Agreements: Sexual Harassment and the Contract of Silence, 
THE GENDER POL’Y REP. (Nov. 14, 2017), https://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/nondisclosure-
agreements-sexual-harassment-and-the-contract-of-silence/ [https://perma.cc/K2DE-399H].   
 101.   Grace, supra note 49. 
 102.   Joni Hersch & Beverly Moran, He Said, She Said, Let’s Hear What the Data Say: Sexual 
Harassment in the Media, Courts, EEOC, and Social Science, 101 KY. L.J. 753, 755 (2012). 
 103.   Hill, supra note 100.   
 104.   Id. 
 105.   Ian Ayres, Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 76, 77 (2018).   
 106.   David A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 165, 186 
(2019). 
 107.   Hill, supra note 100.   
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industry or a business.108  To avoid allowing a perpetrator to reap much of 
the benefit of an NDA, it must be carefully drafted to serve the needs of 
both parties.  Sexual misconduct survivors and their attorneys hope that 
the settlement can compensate the survivor, provide closure, and deter the 
perpetrator from future misconduct.  Lamentably, this goal can be difficult 
to achieve. 
1. Information Asymmetry and Diminishing Marginal Returns to 
Confidentiality 
Confidentiality clauses in sexual misconduct settlements can extract a 
high price from the accused and, accordingly, could serve as a deterrent 
from engaging in future misconduct.  Ideally, if the monetary settlement 
figure is sufficiently high, then the perpetrator will realize the painful 
financial consequences of further misconduct and refrain.  Unfortunately, 
this is not the reality.  For sexual misconduct survivors, the situation is 
often far from ideal because they and their attorneys do not have a good 
method for evaluating the perpetrator’s level of exposure.109 
There is a substantial information asymmetry between the survivor 
and the perpetrator.  An informed understanding would require the sexual 
misconduct survivor to know how many other potential lawsuits the 
perpetrator might be facing.110  Rarely does a sexual misconduct survivor 
know the identities, much less the number, of a perpetrator’s other 
misdeeds.111  Any efforts a sexual misconduct survivor might make to find 
other survivors—asking others who have had contact with the perpetrator, 
advertising online, etc.—shatter any confidentiality and reduce the 
individual survivor’s potential gain.112  Because sexual misconduct 
survivors are unaware of the perpetrator’s exposure, they underestimate 
the value of their claim. 
This information asymmetry puts sexual misconduct survivors at a 
bargaining disadvantage.  Survivors of serial perpetrators—such as 
survivors of Weinstein’s misconduct, of which there are more than 
eighty—likely knew Weinstein had a reputation for inappropriate 
behavior, but they likely did not know the extent of his wrongdoing, nor 
 
 108.   See L. Camille Hébert, Is “Me Too” Only a Social Movement or a Legal Movement Too? 
3–4 (Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 453, 2018); Deborah L. Rhode, #MeToo: Why Now?  
What Next?, 69 DUKE L.J. 377, 390 (2019) (“The more powerful the abuser, the more willing 
organizations have been to forgive and forget.”).   
 109.   Levmore & Fagan, supra note 93, at 318.  
 110.   Id. at 318–20.   
 111.   Id. at 319–20.  
 112.   Id. at 318–19, 333.  
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the lengths he would go to protect his reputation.113  For example, had 
survivors known the full breadth of Weinstein’s sexual misconduct put 
him at risk of losing his company, fortune, and power, they might have 
extracted higher settlements.  Additionally, if the perpetrator is facing 
many potential claims, then the perpetrator will divide the gain from 
confidentiality among the sexual misconduct survivors.114  Survivors may 
seek privacy for themselves, further reducing their bargaining power.115  
The smaller the settlement for each sexual misconduct survivor, the lower 
the incentive of each survivor to uphold the confidentiality agreement.116  
As a result, there are diminishing marginal returns to confidentiality as the 
perpetrator commits more offenses; the deterrence value to the perpetrator 
of each settlement is decreased and survivor recoveries are decreased 
accordingly. 
Sexual misconduct survivors are unlikely to extract from a perpetrator 
a settlement payment large enough to deter the perpetrator from further 
misconduct.117  Additionally, “data reveals that ‘sexual harassment 
appears to happen more frequently in industries dominated by low-wage 
workers, . . .’ suggest[ing] that the [sexual misconduct survivors] filing 
most often are likely those who need the pay-outs most—and therefore 
may be more likely to settle at lower amounts,” with even less deterrent 
value.118  Ultimately, amounts paid for confidentiality clauses in sexual 
harassment and sexual assault cases are unlikely to have any deterrent 
effect. 
2. Competing Interests: The Public v. Individual Sexual Misconduct 
Survivor 
Survivors and perpetrators may seek to cover the whole ordeal in 
darkness, but the public has an interest in shining the light on sexual 
misconduct.  These competing interests are at the heart of the debate 
around NDAs.  Gloria Allred, a prominent feminist lawyer who has 
represented many sexual misconduct survivors, has defended the use of 
NDAs, focusing on the benefit to the individual sexual misconduct 
 
 113.   See Sara M. Moniuszko & Cara Kelly, Harvey Weinstein Scandal: A Complete List of the 
87 Accusers, USA TODAY (June 1, 2018, 4:51 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/life/people/2017/10/27/weinstein-scandal-complete-list-accusers/804663001/ [https://perma.cc/ 
37VA-NXK8].   
 114.   Levmore & Fagan, supra note 93, at 320.   
 115.   See infra Section III.C. 
 116.   Levmore & Fagan, supra note 93, at 320.   
 117.   Id. at 322.   
 118.   Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 106, at 185 (analyzing unpublished EEOC data). 
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survivor.119  Allred argues that sexual misconduct survivors “at the very 
least have choices when it comes to asserting their legal rights . . . .”120  
Allred says she “always present[s] [her] clients with all the benefits and 
risks of each of their legal options so that they can make an informed 
decision as to what they believe is in their best interest.”121  Allred is 
concerned that litigation may add to survivors’ suffering, whereas 
settlements offer survivors a voluntary, confidential method of redress.122 
Despite the interests of the individual survivor, courts and legislatures 
should recognize a community right to transparency surrounding sexual 
misconduct.  An NDA can be an individual sexual misconduct survivor’s 
best option in a very difficult situation.123  However, sexual misconduct 
survivors may be receiving their confidential settlement at the expense of 
other survivors.124  This is the problem with the New York law, which 
allows the use of an NDA if it is the sexual misconduct survivor’s 
preference.125  Such laws recognize that NDAs can be beneficial to sexual 
misconduct survivors, but prevent the public—particularly the 
perpetrator’s future targets—from knowing the danger posed by an 
individual with a history of sexual misconduct.  As a result, the settling 
survivor unintentionally receives confidentiality at the expense of 
unwarned third parties.  This is undesirable. 
Public transparency provides benefits beyond the individual 
perpetrator or workplace.  An example of this benefit is the case of Ellen 
Pao, who publicly sued her venture capital employer for sex 
discrimination.126  Pao lost at trial, but her lawsuit brought much-needed 
public attention to discrimination against women in Silicon Valley and led 
to change.127  Courts often focus only on the individual parties in a single 
case, but these interests must be balanced against the public’s interest in 
transparency. 
 
 119.   Allred, supra note 95.   
 120.   Id.   
 121.   Id. 
 122.   Id. 
 123.   Terry Gross, ‘She Said’ Reveals the People and Practices That Protected Weinstein, NPR 
(Sept. 10, 2019, 1:53 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/10/759384251/she-said-reveals-the-people-
and-practices-that-protected-weinstein [https://perma.cc/3NVS-J8U4].   
 124.   See Levmore & Fagan, supra note 93, at 320.   
 125.   N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-336(1)(a) (McKinney 2019). 
 126.   Pao v. Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers LLC, No. A136090, 2013 WL 3224589, at *2–3 
(Cal. Ct. App. June 26, 2013). 
 127.   See Orly Lobel, The Prisoner’s Dilemma in Airing Fox’s Corporate Culture, FORTUNE (July 
28, 2016, 10:39 AM), https://fortune.com/2016/07/28/fox-corporate-culture-roger-ailes-gretchen-
carlson/ [https://perma.cc/4K5Z-2A9D]; see also Robert Ayes, Note, Importing Foreign Statutory 
Regimes to America: Modernizing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 38 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 105, 
106 (2016).   
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3. Different State Approaches to Balancing Interests: Which is Best? 
States (for our purposes: New York, New Jersey, and California) have 
taken different approaches to balancing the interests in confidentiality of 
individual survivors and the public.  Each law reaches a different balance 
between the need for public awareness of the danger posed by perpetrators 
and sexual misconduct survivors’ right to contract freely and their need 
for confidentiality.  Of these, the California law reaches the correct balance 
by requiring transparency but allowing survivors to keep their identity 
confidential.  Crucially, it also includes penalties for attorneys who include 
NDAs in settlement agreements.128 
New Jersey took the most aggressive approach, effectively 
invalidating all NDAs—this includes both preemptive NDAs and NDAs 
that are part of settlements.129  This law is well-intentioned but does not 
acknowledge that sexual misconduct survivors can benefit from some 
confidentiality.  The New Jersey law goes too far, taking the decision away 
from a sexual misconduct survivor. 
Attorney penalties are essential to ensure compliance with new laws, 
but the New Jersey law does not contain any penalty for attorneys who 
knowingly include unenforceable NDAs.  Discussion surrounding the 
New Jersey law’s effects on employers mentions the use of NDAs even 
though they are unenforceable.130  Due to this reactionary nature of court 
enforcement,131 it is easy to imagine that sexual misconduct survivors will 
assume every provision in the settlement agreement is enforceable and 
stay silent—with potentially devastating consequences that undermine the 
purpose of the New Jersey law.132 
New York law allows NDAs to be used at the sexual misconduct 
survivor’s request.133  This law gives the decision-making power to sexual 
misconduct survivors, a piece missing from the New Jersey law.  But the 
New York law does not do enough to deter serial predators because 
perpetrators still benefit from a sexual misconduct survivor’s immediate 
need for confidentiality and a settlement.134  This law gives more weight 
to the individual sexual misconduct survivor at the expense of the 
 
 128.   CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002(e) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).   
 129.   N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.8 (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c. 136 and J.R. No. 2); see 
supra Section II.C. 
 130.   See MacDonald & Shea, supra note 70 (providing an example of using an NDA in a 
settlement despite the non-disclosure provision being unenforceable). 
 131.   See infra Section III.B (discussing why court enforcement is inherently reactionary). 
 132.   See supra Section III.A.1. 
 133.   N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-336(1)(a) (McKinney 2019). 
 134.   See supra Section III.A.1. 
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unwarned public.135  And, like the New Jersey law, the New York law does 
not contain any explicit disciplinary consequences for attorneys who use 
NDAs in violation of the law. 
The California State Legislature has achieved the proper balance 
between the public’s interest and the interest of the individual sexual 
misconduct survivor.  The California law bans the use of NDAs in 
settlements136 but allows the sexual misconduct survivor’s identity to be 
concealed.137  Sexual misconduct survivors seeking confidentiality are 
most concerned with being labelled litigious, a tattletale, or a victim—and 
the California law prevents their names from being associated with the 
claim of sexual misconduct.  The privacy the law affords reduces the risk 
that the law will have chilling effects.  Survivors’ incentives to settle 
remain because they can forego an expensive, arduous, and unpredictable 
trial.  Survivors’ recovery will only encompass the harm suffered. 
Crucially, the California law includes disciplinary consequences for 
attorneys that do not comply with the new law,138 unlike the New Jersey 
and New York laws.  The law could provide grounds for disciplinary 
action against defense attorneys who include an NDA in a settlement or a 
plaintiff’s attorney who advises a client to sign a settlement including an 
NDA.139  This is an essential component because it helps to prevent the 
use of NDAs during the drafting process, reducing confusion and 
providing sexual misconduct survivors their full rights. 
Critics have expressed concerns that a law like California’s will make 
it more difficult for sexual misconduct survivors to procure a maximum 
settlement amount because perpetrators have less incentive to settle if they 
are not guaranteed total secrecy.140  Confidentiality increases the 
bargaining range, allowing confidentiality to be priced, and improves the 
likelihood of settlement.141  Nonetheless, some settlement incentives 
remain, such as the incentive to avoid expensive litigation and/or 
 
 135.   Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 106, at 172, 187 (“[A]dvocates are beginning to 
conceptualize efforts to regulate or eliminate hush contracts . . . arguing that individuals’ lives and 
well-being are threatened every time a perpetrator of sexual misconduct is allowed to retain his or her 
privacy at the expense of a far more numerous pool of potential future victims.”). 
 136.   CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.); see 
also Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 106, at 189 (“[H]ush contracts are unenforceable in the 
Sunshine State.”). 
 137.   CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001(c).   
 138.   Id. § 1002(e).   
 139.   Id. 
 140.   Stacy Perman, #MeToo Law Restricts Use of Nondisclosure Agreements in Sexual 
Misconduct Cases, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/ 
business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-nda-hollywood-20181231-story.html [https://perma.cc/9W7R-QBE8].   
 141.   See Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential 
Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 878–80 (2007).   
2021] TOXIC SECRECY 565 
reputational damage.142  Though the settlement incentives are reduced and 
sexual misconduct survivors’ recoveries may be reduced, this is an 
acceptable price to pay for eliminating secrecy.  The cost of the public’s 
interest in knowing the sexual misconduct underlying the claim is spread 
amongst all sexual misconduct survivors, who retain their privacy, but the 
law does not make settlement impossible. 
B. Drafting Settlement NDAs: A Process in Need of Reform 
Zelda Perkins, who settled her claim with Weinstein, called the 
process of drafting the non-disclosure provision in her settlement 
agreement “incredibly distressing.”143  She felt her own lawyers were not 
supportive; she felt “isolated.”144  Another Weinstein sexual misconduct 
survivor, Ambra Battilana Gutierrez, said that when she signed her NDA, 
she “was really disoriented,” and “didn’t even understand . . . what [she] 
was doing with all those papers . . . .”145  NDAs between Weinstein and 
survivors of his sexual misconduct were often shockingly restrictive.  The 
terms dictated that survivors had to seek special permission from 
Weinstein to disclose the settlements to their therapists and accountants.146  
Stories like those of Ms. Perkins, Ms. Battilana Gutierrez, and other voices 
of the #MeToo movement expose the failure of the legal system to 
properly advocate for sexual misconduct survivors.147 
To reform the usage of settlement NDAs,148 it is necessary to focus on 
the drafting of these agreements because enforcement by courts is 
inherently reactionary.  To reach a court, a sexual misconduct survivor 
must decide to break the agreement and risk repayment of the settlement 
amount.  NDAs often contain “liquidated damages” provisions, which 
require sexual misconduct survivors to pay an “astronomical sum” to 
 
 142.   Suzanne Lucas, Why Employers Settle Sexual Harassment Claims, CBS NEWS (Nov. 3, 
2011, 5:04 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-employers-settle-sexual-harassment-claims/ 
[https://perma.cc/3TVG-R6K2].   
 143.   Matthew Garrahan, Harvey Weinstein: How Lawyers Kept a Lid on Sexual Harassment 
Claims, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1dc8a8ae-b7e0-11e7-8c12-
5661783e5589 [https://perma.cc/2VJH-BYDY]. 
 144.   Id. 
 145.   Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, supra note 8.   
 146.   Gross, supra note 123.   
 147.   See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT Preamble and Scope [2] (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“As 
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.  As 
negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest 
dealings with others.”). 
 148.   Preemptive NDAs and quasi-NDAs in mandatory arbitration agreements are both generally 
in employment agreements with little to no negotiation between the parties.  Accordingly, this Section 
discusses the drafting process of settlement NDAs.  
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perpetrators if they break confidentiality.149  Sexual misconduct survivors 
without legal training are unlikely to know if an NDA they have signed is 
unenforceable, but they will likely be aware of the penalties for breaching 
the NDA.150  In the majority of states that still allow NDAs, reform efforts 
must focus on the drafting and negotiation process. 
Armed with knowledge about the problems in settlement negotiations, 
attorneys for survivors of sexual misconduct should rethink their handling 
of these claims.  First, attorneys must consider the trauma sexual 
misconduct survivors have faced and how that trauma may affect the 
client’s decision making.  Second, if attorneys are in a state that still allows 
the use of NDAs, attorneys should no longer consider NDAs to be 
boilerplate.  Lastly, attorneys should carefully consider the terms of the 
NDA. 
Attorneys for sexual misconduct survivors should consider how the 
sexual misconduct has affected their client.  What may be a routine 
employment claim settlement to an attorney is likely a traumatic, difficult 
process for a client.  It is essential that attorneys for survivors think beyond 
dollar figures and consider what else their clients want and need from the 
perpetrator.  Restorative justice provides useful insights.151  Survivors of 
sexual misconduct may want acknowledgement from the perpetrator or 
want perpetrators to “accept responsibility for having caused harm.”152 
Attorneys must be mindful that trauma from experiencing sexual 
misconduct might cloud the client’s decision-making.  Survivors of sexual 
misconduct may settle too quickly to protect their privacy and because 
they feel embarrassed.153  If a sexual misconduct survivor wants to settle 
too quickly, the lawyer has to balance her ethical obligation to seek an 
advantageous result for her client,154 which may require careful thought 
and take time, with her duty to abide by her client’s decisions.155  To avoid 
a rushed settlement agreement, attorneys should encourage sexual 
misconduct survivors to process their trauma in whatever form is most 
 
 149.   Chaudry, supra note 59, at 234.  
 150.   See Former Weinstein Assistant Broke a NDA, supra note 7 (“I presumed . . . that if we 
didn’t keep to strictly our demands, we’d be sent to jail.  That’s what we thought.”). 
 151.   See generally Lesley Wexler, Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Colleen Murphy, #MeToo, Time’s 
Up, and Theories of Justice, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 45 (2019) (exploring “the meaning, utility, and 
complexities of restorative justice and the insights of transitional justice for dealing with sexual 
misconduct in the workplace.”).  
 152.   Lesley Wexler & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, #MeToo and Restorative Justice, AM. BAR ASS’N 
(Winter 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/publications/dispute_ 
resolution_magazine/2019/winter-2019-me-too/metoo-and-restorative-justice/ [https://perma.cc/ 
UD89-MZDS]. 
 153.   Wexler et al., supra note 151.  
 154.   MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT Preamble and Scope [2] (AM. B. ASS’N 2020).   
 155.   MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 1.2(a) (AM. B. ASS’N 2020). 
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appropriate.  Additionally, attorneys should resist pressure from the 
defense to move quickly.156  Above all, in every client interaction, 
attorneys should make every effort to make their client feel heard and 
supported; the experiences of Ms. Perkins and Ms. Battilana Gutierrez are 
instructive here. 
Attorneys on both sides should no longer consider NDAs to be 
boilerplate and should ask clients at the beginning of the settlement 
process whether they want an NDA.  If a client seeks confidentiality, and 
NDAs are allowed in the jurisdiction, then the silence of the sexual 
misconduct survivor has value and that value should be vigorously 
negotiated.157  When drafting the agreement, attorneys should ensure 
sexual misconduct survivors are not barred from discussing the abuse they 
suffered.158  NDAs should contain exceptions that allow sexual 
misconduct survivors to discuss their experiences and the settlement with 
therapists, spouses, or other family members.159  Attorneys should 
considering implementing innovative solutions, like semi-confidential 
NDAs160 or NDAs designed to impede repeat offenders.161 
C. Confidentiality in Arbitration 
Arbitration is a promising forum for sexual misconduct survivors, but 
confidentiality provisions in mandatory arbitration agreements erode the 
benefits of arbitration and lead to misunderstandings about arbitration.162  
Arbitration provides advantages to both parties.  Litigation is notoriously 
expensive and time-consuming, whereas arbitration is faster, cheaper, and 
 
 156.   See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. L. § 5-336(1)(b) (McKinney 2019) (mandating that a sexual 
misconduct survivor has twenty-one days to consider the inclusion of a non-disclosure provision).  
 157.   See supra Section III.A. 
 158.   Grace, supra note 49. 
 159.   Id. 
 160.   See generally Levmore & Fagan, supra note 93 (proposing semi-confidential settlements 
and criteria to evaluate the proper amount of confidentiality).   
 161.   See Ayres, supra note 105, at 79 (“NDAs should be enforceable only (1) if they explicitly 
describe the rights which the survivor retains, notwithstanding the NDA, to report the perpetrator’s 
behavior to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and other investigative 
authorities; (2) if they explicitly make the accuser’s promises to not disclose conditional on the 
perpetrator not misrepresenting any of the survivor and perpetrator’s past interactions; and (3) if the 
underlying survivor allegations are deposited in an information escrow that would be released for 
investigation by the EEOC if another complaint is received against the same perpetrator.”); but see 
Marissa Ditkowsky, #UsToo: The Disparate Impact of and Ineffective Response to Sexual Harassment 
of Low-Wage Workers, 26 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 69, 101–04 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks 
of Ayres’ solution).   
 162.   See Drahozal, supra note 58, at 29–30 (describing the misunderstanding amongst 
commentators and the public about the confidential nature of arbitration).   
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more informal.163  Arbitration is private; uninvited third parties may not 
access the arbitration, observe its proceedings, or disclose any 
observations.164  Accordingly, arbitration attracts less publicity, allowing 
parties to save “reputation costs.”165  The privacy of arbitration creates a 
relaxed setting that is intended to foster “friendly peacemaking.”166 
Though oft criticized in the #MeToo conversation,167 arbitration can 
provide important benefits for sexual misconduct survivors.  First, 
arbitration allows survivors to avoid lengthy, expensive, and invasive 
litigation, lowering barriers to filing a complaint and increasing access to 
justice for survivors.  Second, arbitration’s lack of formality can make it 
“kinder and gentler than public” litigation.168  This could make sexual 
misconduct survivors more likely to file claims and help survivors avoid 
further trauma.  Lastly, for sexual misconduct survivors seeking to avoid 
embarrassment or reputational damage, the privacy of arbitration is 
appealing.  The survivor does not have to file a lawsuit in court where the 
media and other third parties can see the filing.  Arbitration does not have 
proceedings that are open to the public.  Thus, arbitration provides privacy 
for sexual misconduct survivors, whether the arbitration is mandatory or 
voluntary.  Importantly, survivors can retain control over the 
confidentiality of their claims and their disclosures to third parties.  Thus, 
arbitration may be a desirable option for many sexual misconduct 
survivors.169   
Arbitration and litigation suffer from the same secrecy problems.  
Confidentiality provisions, or quasi-NDAs, in mandatory arbitration 
agreements have “struck a dissonant chord” with sexual misconduct 
survivors who have been disadvantaged by contracts of silence.170  It is 
vital that the law avoid the exploitation of arbitration as a safe haven to 
 
 163.   See Ditkowsky, supra note 161, at 81; Chaudry, supra note 59, at 227–28.  
 164.   Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1255, 1260 (2006).   
 165.   Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1211, 
1212 (2006).   
 166.   Id. at 1215.  
 167.   See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice in 
Employment Law: Where to, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 159–60 (2019) (“For those 
interested in the relationship between social movements, lawmaking, litigation, and mandatory 
arbitration, the current and powerful #MeToo movement offers a perfect, albeit depressing, case 
study.”); Sternlight, supra note 61, at 1635 (naming the two fundamental problems with arbitration as 
“lack of consent and lack of public scrutiny.”).   
 168.   Reuben, supra note 164, at 1279.   
 169.  But see generally Chaudry, supra note 59, at 218 (arguing that adjudication of sexual 
harassment claims “in a private dispute resolution system is not appropriate at this time”).   
 170.   Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, New Battles and Battlegrounds for 
Mandatory Arbitration After Epic Systems, New Prime, and Lamps Plus, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 815, 854 
(2019).   
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hide sexual misconduct, especially given the appeal of arbitration to sexual 
misconduct survivors.171   
Employers should not be allowed to mandate confidentiality 
provisions in arbitration agreements.  Neither the FAA nor the 2000 
Uniform Arbitration Act require confidentiality.172  Furthermore, courts 
have rejected arguments that international arbitration rules require 
confidentiality and that parties have a general understanding of 
confidentiality.173  Administrative employment law judges should heavily 
scrutinize and invalidate many quasi-NDAs in employment mandatory 
arbitration agreements.174   
Courts called upon to enforce arbitration agreements should consider 
invalidating quasi-NDAs.  Some courts have addressed the potential for 
unfairness in mandatory arbitration by invalidating specific provisions of 
arbitration agreements.  For example, California courts have scrutinized 
arbitration agreements to ensure the neutrality of the arbitration, ensure 
adequate discovery, remove limits on damages or remedies, require 
written decisions permitting some judicial review, and put limitations on 
costs.175  These standards uphold the “integrity of the arbitration process” 
and prevent it from being held unconscionable.176 
Courts must consider whether non-enforcement of a quasi-NDA is in 
the public’s best interest.177  Courts should weigh the parties’ interests in 
confidentiality with the negative externalities of secrecy on the public.178  
The norm shift caused by #MeToo should empower courts to weigh 
heavily the potential harm to the public if confidential arbitration allows 
serial perpetrators to hide their misdeeds in a veil of secrecy.  Furthermore, 
courts and arbitration advocates should consider the potential erosion of 
 
 171.   See Reuben, supra note 164, at 1257–58 (referring to discovery and admission of 
perpetrator’s previous arbitrations; discovery issues are outside the scope of this Comment).   
 172.   Greene & O’Brien, supra note 170, at 855.   
 173.   See, e.g., United States v. Panhandle E. Corp., 118 F.R.D. 346, 350 (D. Del. 1988); Reuben, 
supra note 164, at 1266–67; Alexis C. Brown, Presumption Meets Reality: An Exploration of the 
Confidentiality Obligation in International Commercial Arbitration, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 969, 
975–87 (2001). 
 174.   Greene & O’Brien, supra note 170, at 854 (“Confidentiality provisions that prohibit 
discussion of arbitration proceedings and awards should fail the [National Labor Relations] Board’s 
Boeing Category 3 test for validity because there are no legitimate interests in banning such 
discussion.”). 
 175.   See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 682–85 (Cal. 2000).   
 176.   Id. at 682.  
 177.   Discovery motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) for documents related to 
prior, resolved arbitration proceedings are outside the scope of this Comment; see Reuben, supra note 
164, at 1257 (proposing a middle ground that balances parties’ need for a “reliable level of 
confidentiality” with the need to avoid allowing arbitration to be exploited as a way to hide evidence 
helpful or necessary for future litigants).   
 178.   See supra Section III.A.1. 
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confidence in the private dispute resolution system if arbitration is abused 
as a haven for perpetrators.  Courts should still enforce mandatory 
arbitration agreements, but the darkness must be lifted. 
Confidentiality provisions present an opportunity for states looking to 
guard against the toxic effects of secrecy.  State legislatures could regulate 
quasi-NDAs in arbitration agreements the same way that they already 
regulate ordinary NDAs.179  These laws would forbid any clause within 
the arbitration agreement that requires the facts of the claim—except the 
identity of the sexual misconduct survivor—to be confidential.180  Laws 
targeted at confidentiality provisions, rather than arbitration itself, may be 
able to avoid being struck down on preemption grounds181 like the New 
York law in Latif.182 
The FAA contains a saving clause that provides an avenue for 
challenges to arbitration agreements.183  The saving clause allows courts 
to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”184  The Supreme Court 
has interpreted this saving clause to recognize “only defenses that apply to 
‘any’ contract.”185  Defenses fail to qualify for use under the saving clause 
when they interfere with a “fundamental attribute[] of arbitration.”186  As 
a result, the only way for an employee to challenge a mandatory arbitration 
agreement is to use a “[s]tandard contract argument[] like 
unconscionability, fraud, or lack of agreement . . . .”187  Such arguments 
are rarely successful but could be revitalized thanks to the shifting norms 
brought about by #MeToo.188 
 
 179.   See supra Section II.C. 
 180.   See supra Section III.A.3. 
 181.   Preemption analysis under the FAA is outside the scope of this Comment.  For a discussion 
of the topic, see generally Christopher R. Drahozal, FAA Preemption After Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153 (2014) (analyzing the preemption issues of arbitration agreements with quasi-
NDAs); Kathleen McCullough, Note, Mandatory Arbitration and Sexual Harassment Claims: 
#MeToo- and Time’s Up-Inspired Action Against the Federal Arbitration Act, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2653 (2019) (examining the enactment and evolution of the FAA and #MeToo-inspired state laws 
targeting mandatory arbitration).   
 182.   Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 18-cv-11528 (DLC), 2019 WL 2610985 (S.D.N.Y. June 
26, 2019); see supra Section II.D. 
 183.   9 U.S.C. § 2.   
 184.   Id. 
 185.   Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018).   
 186.   Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011)).  
 187.   Sternlight, supra note 167, at 178. 
 188.   Id.; see infra Section III.D for a discussion of traditional contract defenses and NDAs; see 
also Jeff Guarrera, Mandatory Arbitration: Inherently Unconscionable, but Immune from 
Unconscionability, 40 W. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 97–100 (2012).   
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D. The Judicial Role in Enforcing NDAs: Traditional Contract Defenses 
1. Invalidating Preemptive and Settlement NDAs with Public Policy 
and Unconscionability 
If an NDA comes to a court for enforcement, the court must consider 
insight provided by the #MeToo movement in its evaluation of the NDA.  
For the states where NDAs in sexual misconduct settlements are not 
regulated by #MeToo-inspired legislation, contract law is the vehicle of 
enforcement.  #MeToo exposed the brazen use of NDAs by perpetrators, 
and courts should respond by taking a “heightened role in determining 
whether [NDAs] are enforceable as a matter of law.”189  Courts have been 
increasingly “reluctant to interfere with contracts”190 but “sterile[,] . . . rote 
enforcement” is a pernicious trend because it “threatens to rob contracting 
of the moral force that it needs to achieve efficacy and legitimacy in a 
world where almost no contracts are read, breached, or sued upon.”191 
Contract law provides limitations on the freedom to contract and 
refuses to enforce contracts that include duress, undue influence, 
unconscionability, mistake, and public policy.192  However, “current 
approaches largely fail to grapple effectively with the problems” posed by 
preemptive and settlement NDAs.193  Unconscionability and public policy 
are the strongest limitations a court could use in this context. 
i. Unconscionability 
An NDA may be unenforceable if it is unconscionable.194  
Traditionally, an unconscionable contract is one no person in their right 
mind would offer or accept.195  The Second Restatement of Contracts lists 
factors that courts should use to analyze a contract for 
unconscionability.196  Notably, the Second Restatement provides that a 
contract is not unconscionable solely because parties have unequal 
bargaining power, because ultimately the party with less bargaining power 
assumes more risk, nor because there is inadequate consideration.197  
 
 189.   Prasad, supra note 36, at 2509.   
 190.   Id. at 2514.   
 191.   Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 106, at 171.   
 192.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151 (mistake), 174 (duress), 177 (undue 
influence), 178 (public policy), 208 (unconscionability) (AM. L. INST. 1981).   
 193.   Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 106, at 189.   
 194.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. L. INST. 1981).   
 195.   Id. § 208 cmt. b. 
 196.   Id. § 208 cmt. a. 
 197.   Id. § 208 cmts. c–d. 
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Instead, courts must take a holistic approach using a confluence of factors 
such as a large disparity in bargaining power, terms that unreasonably 
favor a stronger party, and a large difference in the value of consideration 
exchanged.198 
Courts must consider the dramatic norm cascade of #MeToo when 
evaluating disparity in bargaining power.199  #MeToo has changed how 
people view sexual misconduct and survivors of sexual misconduct, and 
courts should follow suit.200  Courts must view sexual misconduct as 
motivated by gender hostility or sexual stereotypes, rather than motivated 
by sexual desire.201  That sexual misconduct is motivated by power was 
made glaringly obvious by #MeToo and has been shown in empirical 
studies.202  As a result, courts should find more power disparities between 
the perpetrator and the sexual misconduct survivor in settlement NDA 
negotiations. 
When evaluating an NDA for unconscionability, courts must 
scrutinize the drafting process.203  The framework courts should employ 
is: (1) whether the NDA was considered boilerplate or was the product of 
negotiation; (2) which party drafted the NDA, and; (3) how long the sexual 
misconduct survivor had to contemplate the NDA.204  These insights can 
help courts determine whether the settlement NDA was an agreement 
reached via negotiation and informed, mutual consent.  For example, if 
sexual misconduct survivors testify that they had no idea what they were 
signing at the time,205 that is strong indication that they did not give 
informed consent and that there existed a large disparity in bargaining 
power.206  By understanding more about the nature of sexual misconduct 
and using a framework to evaluate the NDA drafting process, courts 
should make more findings of unconscionable NDAs.  #MeToo has shown 
 
 198.   Id. 
 199.   Joan C. Williams, Jodi Short, Margot Brooks, Hilary Hardcastle, Tiffanie Ellis & Rayna 
Saron, What’s Reasonable Now? Sexual Harassment Law After the Norm Cascade, 2019 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 139, 149–50 (2019) (crediting Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. 
L. REV. 903, 909 (1996) with coining the term “norm cascade”).   
 200.   Id. at 150–54 (describing with data four new norms that have emerged in the wake of 
#MeToo: (1) sexual harassment is a serious problem; (2) broad agreement about what behaviors 
constitute sexual harassment; (3) employers should not tolerate sexual harassment; (4) sexual 
harassment accusers are credible). 
 201.   Hébert, supra note 108, at 13. 
 202.   See, e.g., Heather McLaughlin, Christopher Uggen, & Amy Blackstone, Sexual Harassment, 
Workplace Authority, and the Paradox of Power, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 625, 641 (2012). 
 203.   See supra Section III.A.3. 
 204.   See supra Section III.A.3. 
 205.   See supra Section III.B. (discussing the experiences of Ms. Battilana Gutierrez and Ms. 
Perkins). 
 206.   See supra Section III.B.  
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that no reasonable person would agree to an NDA that puts limitations on 
talking to a therapist and does not allow survivors to speak to friends, 
family, spouses, parents, and other survivors of the same misconduct.207  
Therefore, courts should find these NDAs and their progeny 
unconscionable. 
ii. Public Policy 
The Second Restatement of Contracts provides that an agreement is 
unenforceable if “the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed . . . 
by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.”208  To weigh 
the interest in enforcement, courts consider: “(a) the parties’ justified 
expectations, (b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were 
denied, and (c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the 
particular term.”209  The factors to weigh a public policy against 
enforcement are: 
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial 
decisions, 
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that 
policy,  
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which 
it was deliberate, and 
(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the 
term.210 
 
It is time for a revitalization of the long-neglected public policy 
doctrine.211  The public policy doctrine is said to be “never argued at all 
but when other points fail.”212  Despite this disfavor, the public policy 
doctrine is ideally suited to balance the needs of individual sexual 
misconduct survivors with potential third-party harms.213  The public 
policy doctrine has the unique ability to “limit[] the externalities that result 
from private contracts.”214  The private bargain between the individual 
sexual misconduct survivor and the perpetrators generates benefits to the 
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Broke a NDA, supra note 7. 
 208.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981).   
 209.   Id. § 178(2).   
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 211.   Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 106, at 189.   
 212.   Id. (quoting Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303, 2 Bing. 229, 251–52 
(Burrough, J.) (C.P.)). 
 213.   Id.   
 214.   Id. at 199.   
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parties but externalizes the costs.215  The public policy doctrine gives 
courts the flexibility to uphold the legitimacy of employment contracts (in 
the case of preemptive NDAs and quasi-NDAs), or settlement agreements 
(in the case of settlement NDAs) as generally enforceable while removing 
the toxic secrecy.  This allows companies and perpetrators to have faith in 
the legitimacy of their agreements but ensures deterrence and 
accountability. 
The cascading norm-shift of #MeToo has resulted in court precedent 
around sexual misconduct and NDAs that is out of touch with our changed 
understanding of sexual misconduct.216  State legislatures have passed 
laws, and thousands of sexual misconduct survivors have come forward.  
Survivors are not asking for a perfect, progressive court; they are asking 
for a court that understands how it has been complicit in the secrecy that 
allowed sexual misconduct perpetrators to abuse them. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
#MeToo was a moment of collective outrage at sexual misconduct and 
the institutions that enable it.  #MeToo showed that secrecy is toxic.  
Sexual misconduct festers in the darkness, a stain on the legal systems that 
prevents the light from shining on it.  Scholars, judges, and lawyers can 
debate the nuances of NDAs ad nauseam, but the most withering 
condemnations of NDAs come from those who have been subject to them.  
Former Weinstein assistant Zelda Perkins put it best when she said, 
“[h]aving an agreement that requires somebody to not speak about an 
abuse or a trauma is unethical.  There is a huge difference between privacy 
and secrecy, and there cannot be secrecy around abusive behavior.”217 
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